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“Law and equity are two things which God has joined, but which man 
has put asunder.” 
-Charles Caleb Colton 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Responsibility to Protect initiative may be termed as a legal 
palliative to a moral dilemma with which international law appeared 
unable to grapple. The legal regime on the use of force had stagnated 
since the Second World War, in particular failing to evolve in tandem 
with the emergence of human rights as a legal concept. The final years of 
the twentieth century brought this fact into sharp relief through NATO’s 
1999 Kosovo intervention, which had failed to attract the backing of the 
UN Security Council, and which therefore seemed, de lege lata illegal. 
However, it was clear from the reaction of many within the international 
legal community that such a conclusion did not sit well. 1999 witnessed 
the beginning of a steady stream of publications – first articles, then 
books – defending NATO’s actions, and drawing intricate frameworks 
that neatly distinguished the legality of humanitarian intervention from 
its ‘legitimacy.’ What this legitimacy – the (moral) standard behind the 
(legal) standard, if you will – actually entailed, however, was a matter of 
some dispute. Hundreds of eager legal and political scholars were 
seduced by the debate, each proffering his or her own standard of ‘when’ 
and ‘how’ to a question that ultimately amounted to ‘whether’ breaking 
the law might be justified. The academic community was treated to tests 
of ‘near-legality,’1 frameworks for ‘saving strangers’2 and weighing of 
‘values’ in the international community.3 Analogies to self-defence,4 to 
jus necessitatis, and to domestic law were trotted out, 5 and we were 
  
 1. Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. 
J. INT’L L. 1 (1999). 
 2. NICHOLAS J. WHEELER, SAVING STRANGERS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 6 (2000). 
 3. See generally Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria jus oritur: Are We Moving  
Towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the 
World Community, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23 (1999). 
 4. F. Tesón, Self-Defence in International Law and Rights of Persons, 18 ETHICS 
& INT’L AFF. 87 (2004). 
 5. THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE – STATE ACTIONS AGAINST  
THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS (2002). 
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permitted to marvel as R. v. Dudley & Stephens and United States v. 
Holmes were transposed to the international legal arena.6 
It was into this world that the Responsibility to Protect entered, a 
world of one crucial question with many, thus far rather unsatisfying, 
approaches. Yet this question clearly warranted an answer, and a 
convincing one, at that. The members of the Atlantic Alliance had been 
prepared to flout an international legal regime in which they were greatly 
invested and which they had helped to design in order, so it seemed, to 
help a Muslim minority in an insignificant province in southern Serbia. 
Furthermore, the NATO allies most certainly realized that their action 
could risk provoking discord with China, and particularly Russia – a 
known Serbian ally – both of which would see their veto power in the 
UN Security Council set at naught if such actions were to become 
commonplace. Consensus, crucial for international law reform, was 
lacking in how to react to the Kosovo intervention. Legal scholarship 
was therefore left grappling with the lex lata, which appeared inflexible 
and unable to respond to gross human rights atrocities when committed 
by governments against their own citizens. 
This article aims to examine the impact of the Responsibility to 
Protect initiative, placing it within the narrative of humanitarian 
intervention in international law. It adopts a critical perspective, 
outlining how a doctrine that was intended to reform international law 
ignored both the letter and the dynamics of the latter. In so doing, it is 
proposed that the Responsibility to Protect as a concept is necessarily 
overly utopian, and as such, was always doomed to its ultimate fate – 
subversion. Rather than ending on this despondent note, however, it is 
submitted that the legal response to injustice that the R2P sought to 
provide might in fact be found within the existing normative corpus of 
international law. It is argued that the long-neglected category of “the 
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations”7 may impact 
upon how the regime governing the use of force and newer normative 
categories such as human rights interact with one another, to the extent 
that black-letter analyses of international law have heretofore been 
  
 6. Id. at 179. 
 7. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, para. 1(c). 
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overly simplistic. Rather than crafting an external remedy, in other 
words, the authors of the Responsibility to Protect Report would have 
done well to improve their understanding of the law itself, wherein they 
might have found what they were looking for all along. 
I. R2P: “ANOTHER CANADIAN CAPER”8 
In a 1999 article, then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan described 
the dilemma involved in the humanitarian intervention debate: 
On the one hand, is it legitimate for a regional organisation to use force 
without a UN mandate? On the other, is it permissible to let gross and 
systematic violations of human rights, with grave humanitarian 
consequences, continue unchecked?
9
 
The Secretary-General quickly proceeded to answer his own question: 
[T]he world cannot stand aside when gross and systematic violations of 
human rights are taking place…intervention must be based on 
legitimate and universal principles.
10
 
The fact that the most senior official of the United Nations was 
prepared to make such a statement was truly remarkable. The “use [of] 
force without a UN mandate” necessarily entailed a breach of the Charter 
rules on the use of force. The idea that the world could not “stand aside” 
ultimately amounted to a plea to would-be interveners to flout the 
international legal regime, in favor of forcible human rights protection 
based on a new, as yet undefined, framework. 
The idea behind the Responsibility to Protect (or “R2P,” as it has been 
styled) was to provide the desired “legitimate and universal principles” to 
  
 8. (Operation) Canadian Caper was the popular moniker ascribed to the joint 
covert rescue by the Canadian government and the United States Central Intelligence 
Agency of six American diplomats who had evaded capture during the seizure of the 
United States embassy in Tehran, Iran on November 4, 1979. 
 9. Kofi Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, ECONOMIST (Sept. 16, 1999),  
available at http://www.economist.com/node/324795. 
 10. Id. 
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which Secretary-General Annan had referred, to concoct a framework for 
humanitarian intervention, and put the debate on threshold standards to 
bed for once and for all. 
A. The Main Tenets of the Initiative 
While I have written in more detail about the Responsibility to Protect 
elsewhere,11 a brief synopsis of the main tenets of the initiative is 
warranted here, in order to contextualize the criticism that will follow. 
The R2P was proposed by the Canadian-sponsored independent 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). 
Building upon previous work undertaken by Francis M. Deng,12 the 
ICISS built its framework around the idea that “State sovereignty implies 
responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its 
people lies with the State itself.” However, per the ICISS, in cases of 
avoidable catastrophes, where States are “unwilling or unable to halt or 
avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international 
responsibility to protect.”13 Framing sovereignty as responsibility, the 
ICISS sought, through the use of alternative language, to get 
governments to think afresh about the real issues involving sovereignty 
and intervention.14 
The Report stresses certain concepts: first, evaluations of situations 
are to be made from the perspective of those persons in need of support. 
Secondly, primary (sovereign) responsibility rests with the State in 
question. Only where the State is unwilling or unable to protect its 
citizens, or when the State is itself the author of gross human rights 
violation, may other States or regional alliances intervene. Thirdly, the 
  
 11. See CIARAN BURKE, AN EQUITABLE FRAMEWORK FOR HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION 59-65 (2013). 
 12. Francis M. Deng, Frontiers of Sovereignty, 8 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 249 (1995); 
FRANCIS M. DENG ET AL., SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN 
AFRICA (1996). 
 13. Gareth J. Evans & Mohamed Sahnoun, The Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of 
the Int’l Comm’n on Intervention and State Sovereignty, xi (2001), available at 
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf. 
 14. Gareth Evans & Mohamed Sahnoun, The Responsibility to Protect, 81 
FOREIGN AFF. 99, 101 (2002). 
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R2P incorporates three key sub-elements, namely the Responsibility to 
React, the Responsibility to Prevent, and the Responsibility to Rebuild. 
Donnelly has correctly noted that “[t]he Responsibility to Protect implies 
a duty to react to situations in which there is a compelling need for 
human protection.”15 This duty represents the rationale for military 
intervention. Evans and Sahnoun reject the Westphalian conception of 
international relations, where “the defining characteristic of sovereignty 
has always been the State’s capacity to make authoritative decisions 
regarding the people and resources within its territory.” Their position is 
that a ‘broad consensus’ has instead emerged, whereby “[s]overeignty as 
responsibility has become the minimum content of good international 
citizenship.”16 The Report unequivocally emphasizes that the primary 
responsibility for the welfare of the persons present on the territory of a 
State rests with the State itself. However, such responsibility may be 
forfeited if certain threshold criteria are satisfied. Per the report, the 
satisfaction of such criteria may serve as a casus belli against the State in 
question.  
In order to justify intervention, the report states that there must first be 
a just cause, comprising (anticipated) loss of life on a large scale or 
large-scale ethnic cleansing. Four further checks should then be carried 
out before an armed intervention may proceed, namely: right intention; 
last resort; the use of proportional means; and that the operation has a 
reasonable prospect of success. These ‘precautionary principles,’ are 
strikingly similar to Just War theory conditions of animus, justa causa, 
persona, and res. They are joined by the final and most controversial 
principle which represents the R2P equivalent of the Just War criterion 
of auctoritas,17 namely right or legitimate authority. 
The controversy surrounding this principle may be easily understood. 
While in Just War theory, auctoritas is the reserve of the sovereign 
  
 15. JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 251 
(2003). 
 16. Evans and Sahnoun, supra note 13, at 101–02. 
 17. See S Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A General History (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2005) 14–20. 
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alone, the ICISS report takes a more nuanced view.18 The report avows 
that the UN Security Council should undoubtedly be the first port of call 
when it comes to authorizing military intervention. “The difficult 
question – starkly raised by the Kosovo war – is whether it should be the 
last.”19 The report notes that any undermining of the Security Council’s 
authority could potentially undermine international order. However, the 
authors of the report underline that they do not wish to rob the Security 
Council of its primary role matters relating to the use of force. Rather, 
they argue that the goal “is not to find alternatives to the Security 
Council as a source of authority, but to make the council work better than 
it has. Security Council authorization should, in all cases, be sought prior 
to any military intervention being carried out.”20 It should be noted that 
the Kosovo intervention, in the wake of which the report was 
commissioned, would in any case be adjudged as impermissible under 
this criterion, since no such authorization was sought. 
The R2P Report, in placing the Security Council center stage, 
suggests that conditions should be appended to the use of the veto by the 
five Permanent Members, stating that they should refrain from vetoing 
resolutions unless “vital state interests” are involved. In the event that the 
Security Council is ‘blocked’ – that is, that it is impossible to procure 
support for a resolution that seeks to exercise the Responsibility to 
Protect – two further institutional options exist, per the Report. Firstly, 
the General Assembly, acting under the 1950 ‘Uniting for Peace’ 
Resolution, may address a majority recommendation for urgent action to 
the Security Council, as happened in Korea (1950), Egypt (1956), and 
Congo (1960). Secondly, regional organizations, acting under Chapter 
VIII of the Charter, may intervene unilaterally, subject to seeking 
subsequent Security Council authorization, as was the case with the 
ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone and Liberia. 
The merit of such institutional solutions may be debated. However, 
they still leave open the question of what happens when the Security 
Council – through one institutional means, fails to exercise its 
  
 18. See L Glanville, “The Responsibility to Protect Beyond Borders”, 12(1) 
Human Rights Law Review (2012) 1. 
 19. Evans and Sahnoun, supra note 13, at 106. 
 20. Id.  
642 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 23.3 
 
Responsibility to Protect. “[W]hich of the two evils is the worse: the 
damage to the international order if the Security Council is bypassed, or 
the damage to that order if human beings are slaughtered while the 
Security Council stands by?”21 Evans and Sahnoun’s question echoes the 
dilemma highlighted by Kofi Annan in 1999, and indeed the central 
dilemma underpinning the entire humanitarian intervention debate. It is 
in answering this question that the R2P Report becomes truly original. 
Much like many international legal scholars, the Report deems 
unauthorized intervention undesirable, but dubs it as preferable to 
laissez-faire, as a last resort.22 The threshold criteria outlined above – 
right intention; last resort; the use of proportional means; and that the 
operation has a reasonable prospect of success – are then proposed. 
B. Reception of the Responsibility to Protect in the International 
Arena 
The R2P received a somewhat ambivalent welcome. Published in the 
aftermath of the September 11
th
 terrorist attacks in the United States, it 
entered into a world less focused on humanitarian intervention than on a 
‘war on terror,’ ‘rogue States’ and the ‘axis of evil.’ States were crafting 
new justifications for the use of force, but they had little to do with 
human rights protection. Aside from this, a number of the choices made 
by the Report’s drafters were somewhat surprising. The Report did not 
draw meaningful attention to the jus cogens status of human rights, 
  
 21. Id. at 104. 
 22. See discussion in: M Byers and S Chesterman, ‘Changing the Rules about 
Rules? Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention and the Future of International Law’ in JL 
Holzgrefe and RO Keohane (eds), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and 
Political Dilemmas (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003) 177; K-C Tan,  
‘Enforcing Global Justice: The Problem of Intervention’ in R Pierik and W Werner (eds),  
Cosmopolitanism in Context: Perspectives from International Law and Political Theory 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009); O Corten, ‘Vers une  
“Déterritorialisation” de l’Interdiction du Recours à la Force dans les Relations  
Internationales?’ (2009) 5 Annuário Brasileiro de Direito Internacional 207; O Corten  
and P Klein, ‘L’autorisation de recourir à la force à des fins humanitaires: droit  
d’ingérence ou retour aux sources?’ (1993) 4 European Journal of International Law  
506. 
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presumably fearing a riposte that the Article 2(4) prohibition is also 
peremptory.23 As Chandler has noted, the Report adopts the criticism of 
many non- Western States, positing that the Security Council is in need 
of reform and is unrepresentative.24 However, it argues against making 
the final authority for decisions on humanitarian intervention more 
democratic, rejecting the idea that the General Assembly should gain 
(final) authority in cases of Security Council deadlock. 
As a result of the above, as well as the political climate resulting from 
the United States-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, one is forced to agree with 
Alex Bellamy that, “it is remarkable that a consensus was produced at 
the 2005 [United Nations] World Summit [in favor of the Responsibility 
to Protect].”25 It is indeed remarkable, but, as Bellamy has 
acknowledged, not incomprehensible. Rather, the fact that the world 
warmed to the R2P was due to a number of significant compromises 
reached during the course of negotiations for the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document. 
In the first instance, the question of the ‘unreasonable veto’ (and 
authorization by an authority other than the Security Council) was 
quietly dropped from the agenda. Indeed, Canada, sponsoring the 
initiative went so far as to posit that that if intervention could only be 
“undertaken at the cost of undermining the stability of the state-based 
international order, then sovereignty should trump humanitarian 
action.”26 Secondly, the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change added serious breaches of 
international humanitarian law to the ‘just cause’ thresholds. It also 
added a preventive component to the just cause criterion, allowing 
intervention to take place if an imminent threat was apprehended. 
  
 23. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v 
United States) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [1984] ICJ Rep 392. 
 24. D Chandler, ‘The Responsibility to Protect? Imposing the Liberal Peace: A 
Critique’ (paper presented to the British International Studies Association annual  
conference at the London School of Economics, 16–18 December 2002 (amended  
version)). 
 25. AJ Bellamy, Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian  
Intervention and the 2005 World Summit, 20 ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 143, 
153 (2006). 
 26. Id. 
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Finally, the UN General Assembly’s to dilution of the concept was 
partially engineered to procure the support of the United States. The 
Bush administration’s National Security Strategy of 2002 had a number 
of common tenets with the R2P. In assessing whether an intervention 
could take place, it proposed the classification of certain countries as 
‘rogue states.’ Classification as such depended on internal factors within 
the State, albeit focusing on harboring terrorists and dangerous munitions 
rather than human rights violations. Both concepts, however, argued for 
lifting the veil of sovereignty in certain circumstances. The US appeared 
willing to cautiously engage with the R2P Report, but posited that the 
responsibility of the host State – legal responsibility – should be 
distinguished from that of the international community – moral 
responsibility. In keeping with this argument, the General Assembly 
hardened the test for transferring responsibility to international society, 
and weakened the nature of international responsibility. 
With the above adjustments, the R2P doctrine adopted by the General 
Assembly in 2005 was a very different beast to that proposed by the 
ICISS in 2001, having placed the Responsibility to Protect squarely 
within the purview of the Security Council. 
II. FAULT LINES 
The adoption of the R2P via the World Summit Outcome Document 
represented a boon for the ICISS. Further, in 2009, despite some debate, 
the UN General Assembly,27 overwhelmingly reaffirmed the 2005 
position,28 and the Security Council has referenced it in twenty-one 
resolutions since 2006, most recently involving Syria.29  The Canadian 
  
 27. G.A. Res. 63/308, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/308 (Sept. 14, 2009). 
 28. Id.  
 29. S.C. Res. 2139 U.N. Doc. S/RES/2139 (Feb. 22, 2014); S.C. Res. 2134, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/2134 (Jan. 28, 2014); S.C Res. 2121, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2121 (Oct. 10, 
2013); S.C. Res. 2117, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2117 (Sept. 26, 2013); S.C. Res. 2019, U.N. 
Doc. S/Res/2019 (July 11, 2013); S.C. Res. 2095, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2095 (Apr. 25, 
2013); S.C. Res. 2093, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2093 (Mar. 6, 2013); S.C. Res. 2085, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/2085 (Dec. 19, 2012); S.C. Res. 2040, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2040 (Mar. 12, 2012); 
S.C. Res. 2016, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2016 (Oct. 27, 2011); S.C. Res. 2014, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/2014 (Oct. 21, 2011);  S.C. Res. 1996, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1996 (Jul. 8, 2011); S.C. 
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initiative had succeeded, convincing the UN General Assembly to 
resoundingly adopt an adapted version of the original concept, within 
four years of the original report. It is no exaggeration to say that this was 
a significant milestone. Just as Gareth Evans had hoped, this was not 
merely another blue riband report that would end up lining dusty 
bookshelves.30 Brunnée and Toope brand the R2P’s inclusion in the 
Outcome Document “astonishing,” noting that now that the norm has 
been formally endorsed, it may “present a fundamental challenge to 
structural imperatives” and has the potential for “transformative change 
in the deep structures of sovereignty.”31 Despite this, both the R2P as a 
concept and its mise en oeuvre are certainly susceptible to criticism. This 
section will offer some observations as to the problems that may be 
identified with the framework. 
As well as clouding the debate, it is clear that the R2P struggles to set 
the benchmark for when and how intervention may take place. As noted 
above, a doctrine prompted by NATO’s Kosovo intervention would not 
have permitted such an intervention to take place. In this regard, Thomas 
Weiss underlines that the six threshold criteria set the bar extremely high 
for potential intervention, while two other ‘obvious’ causal factors for 
humanitarian intervention are omitted from ‘just cause’, namely the 
overthrow of democratically-elected regimes and massive abuses of 
human rights.32 One may agree or disagree with Weiss about the 
overthrow of democracies, but gross and systematic human rights abuses 
would certainly seem a fitting casus belli, if indeed intervention is to be 
permitted.  
The choices made with regard to the threshold criteria, and the fact 
that gross human rights abuses (as well as systematic racial 
  
Res. 1975, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1975 (Mar. 30, 2011); S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011); S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011); 
S.C. Res. 1894, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1894 (Nov. 11, 2009); S.C. Res. 1706, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006); S.C. Res 1674, U.N. Doc. S/RES/8710 (Apr. 28, 2006).  
 30. Gareth Evans, From Humanitarian Intervention to Responsibility to Protect, 
24 WIS. INT’L L. J. 703, 712 (2006).  
 31. Jutta Buunée & Stephen Toope, Norms, Institutions and UN Reform: The 
Responsibility to Protect, 2 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 121, 127-28 (2006).  
 32. Thomas G. Weiss, The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The  
Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era, 35 SEC. DIALOGUE 135, 138-39 (2004). 
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discrimination) are not included is reflective of an aversion toward 
international law in general (rather than just the current regime on the use 
of force) on the part of the ICISS, as the latter represent jus cogens 
principles.33 This is symptomatic of a general rootlessness on the part of 
the R2P. While aiming to transform the international legal regime on the 
use of force, it fails to take sufficient account of the latter, either with 
regard to the letter of the law or the nature of international law in 
general. 
A. “The Letter of the Law” – Detachment from the Factual State 
of International Law 
The R2P Report, in expounding its sovereignty-as-responsibility 
central theme, makes extensive use of novel terminology. In particular, 
there is a conscious effort to change the labelling of the humanitarian 
intervention debate from ‘intervention’ to ‘protection.’ This highlights 
the idea that responsibility may be transferred – first from the State to the 
Security Council, and thereafter potentially further – in the event that the 
State fails to exercise its responsibility. It thus provides a neat link 
between forcible intervention and human rights abuses. However, such 
terminological framing, although stylishly presented, fails to change the 
legal picture in any way whatsoever. Employing alternative terms cannot 
and will not affect the legitimacy, legality, or justifiability of the act in 
question. In addition, it is worth highlighting that any instrument that 
purports to chart a normative framework is out of the authors’ control as 
soon as it leaves the printing press. Prosper Weil warned of the threat of 
relative normativity through the growth of soft law instruments, opining 
that such innovations can relativize and destabilize international law 
norms and create confusion concerning the expectations of States.34 
Public international law accords a meager role to travaux préparatoires 
for the purposes of interpretation, with more weight being given to 
subsequent practice. The real substantive content of the norms 
necessarily remains indeterminate, as their interpretation is left to the 
  
 33. See id. 
 34. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law, 77 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 413, 423 (1983).  
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States, which may use (and/or abuse) them as they choose. Such a 
position is echoed by Bellamy, who notes that during debates concerning 
possible intervention in Darfur, the R2P “allowed traditional opponents 
of intervention to replace largely discredited ‘sovereignty-as-absolute’ – 
type arguments against intervention in supreme humanitarian 
emergencies with arguments about who had the primary responsibility to 
protect Darfur’s civilians.”35 Thus, the Report’s contents may be used to 
oppose as well as enable intervention. 
Despite efforts to gain support for R2P, neither State practice, nor 
widely ratified treaties have embraced the concept, and while UN 
Security Council Resolution 1674 “[r]eaffirm[ed] the provisions of 
paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document 
regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,” this did not 
entail legal incorporation of the R2P’s threshold criteria, nor did it 
constrain the Security Council’s future actions. The Report clearly aims 
to marry the moral prerogative to intervene with some sort of 
international legal framework. However, in doing so, it strays too far 
from the essence of international law, and has no meaningful legal 
basis.36 
Determining why the drafters of the R2P Report made this decision is 
a difficult – if essential – exercise. We might perhaps begin with the jus 
cogens nature of the prohibition on the use of force. The peremptory 
nature of the norm may discouraged the ICISS from challenging it head-
on, as any normative framework in contravention of this general 
prohibition would surely founder. However, if this was indeed the case, it 
was surely worth noting that many basic human rights norms are also 
popularly accorded jus cogens status,37 and that cogentes norms may 
(exclusively) be altered by other norms of the same character. 
  
 35. Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in 
Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq, 19 ETHICS AND INT’L AFFAIRS 31, 52 
(2005).  
 36. Dieter Janssen, Humanitarian Intervention and the Prevention of Genocide, 
10 J. OF GENOCIDE RES. 289, 293 (2008). 
 37. Ottavio Quirico, A Formal Perspective Approach to General Principles of 
(International) Law, 19 EUR. UNIV. INS. WORKING PAPERS: L. 1, 20 (2007). 
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Furthermore, such peremptory human rights norms apply erga omnes. 
The erga omnes nature of the obligation to protect such rights could 
potentially have been used as a basis upon which to ground the interest 
of all States and/or the international community as a whole, since “even 
the consent or acquiescence of the state directly injured does not prevent 
other states from judging the breach” in cases of breaches of erga omnes 
obligations.38 The ICISS’ short-sightedness with regard to international 
law is lamentable, since affirming the jus cogens and erga omnes nature 
of human rights – as well as noting the existing exceptions to the 
prohibition on the use of force, thereby potentially undermining its 
absolute status as a peremptory norm39 – could have served the authors’ 
purposes rather well. 
Instead, the ICISS adopts a different tack: 
The Commission does not start from the UN Charter rules on whether 
intervention is permissible but theorizes the legitimacy of intervention 
from the starting point of the ‘protection’ of the potential victim. This 
enables the Commission to come up with a set of moral criteria for 
military intervention which are held to exist independently of 
international law or any particular political decision or consensus in the 
Security Council.
40
 
The ICISS may also have been wary of engaging with the prohibition 
on the use of force due to the dictum of the ICJ in the Nicaragua 
judgment, that where a breach of a legal rule is accompanied by a 
justification of said breach referring to the rule in question, “the 
significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the 
  
 38. Id. at 30-31.  
 39. In this regard, see James A. Green, Questioning the Peremptory Status of the 
Prohibition of the Use of Force, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 215, 228 (2011). Green notes the 
myriad problems associated with the classification of the prohibition of the use of force 
as a peremptory norm, including the inherent flexibility of the law on the use of force, the 
variety of associated rules and sources, the debated exceptions and the uncertain scope of 
the regime. 
 40. David Chandler, The Responsibility to Protect? Imposing the Liberal Peace: 
A Critique, 11 INT’L  PEACEKEEPING 59, 68-69 (2004).  
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rule.”41 The fear of falling into such a trap might well have been a 
motivating factor for the ICISS, but the proper solution was hardly to 
ignore the normative framework that was the root of the problem the 
Report was designed to remedy. 
R2P fits within the broader discourse championing an extensive right, 
or even a duty, or humanitarian intervention; it removes the question 
from the realm of law stricto sensu to that of law lato sensu, ultimately 
amounting to a model based on legitimacy and values rather than legality 
and rules.42 As Francioni has noted, such theories tend to underestimate 
the fact that the international rule of law is a value in itself, and there is 
no doubt that the rule governing the use of force remains a fundamental 
tenet of the international legal apparatus.43 I have previously described 
the R2P as a ‘bastard son,’ a concept rooted in legal nothingness that 
deliberately disassociates itself from international law, rather than using 
its rules and principles to argue for law reform or an alternative 
interpretation of the existing legal framework.44 This entails that, until 
such a day as it is formally embraced by the Security Council, it will 
remain ‘pie in the sky’ – a theoretical framework, but little more, and 
certainly of little help with regard to resolving the humanitarian 
intervention conundrum. 
B. The Nature of International Law – The Cartesian Trap 
The dissonance – some might call it naïveté – of the ICISS did not 
merely extend to the letter of international law, but also to its nature. The 
R2P Report employs a simplistic and linear approach, setting out a 
number of threshold criteria. Compliance therewith is then assessed in 
  
 41. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v 
United States) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 98. 
 42. M Koskenniemi, “The Lady Doth Protest Too Much” Kosovo, and the Turn 
to Ethics in International Law’ (2002) 6 MLR 159. 
 43. F Francioni, ‘Balancing the Prohibition of Force with the Need to Protect 
Human Rights: A Methodological Approach’ in E Cannizzaro and P Palchetti (eds), 
Customary International Law on the Use of Force: A Methodological Approach (Leiden, 
Koninklijke Brill NV, 2005) 276-7. 
 44. C Burke, An Equitable Framework for Humanitarian Intervention (Oxford 
and Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2013) 72. 
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order to determine the permissibility of intervention. Compliance in this 
context is defined as “the degree to which state behavior conforms to 
what an agreement prescribes or proscribes.”45 However, such a 
definition assumes that the content of an agreement is fully determinate, 
a Cartesian trap, presuming a single, authoritative answer in a legal 
regime peppered with open-textured norms. The problem is exacerbated 
by a plurality of norm interpreters. States may justify their action with 
regard to certain standards of legitimacy or security interests – as NATO 
did in 199946 – while other States, organizations, or commentators may 
adopt diverse standards to assess the legality and/or legitimacy of such 
action. 
In addition to the flexible nature of international legal norms, one 
must remain conscious of the question of forum. While in the context of 
judicial settings such as the ICJ, the malleability of norms is constrained 
by rules of interpretation, and while this is also the case – albeit to a 
lesser degree – in institutional fora, it is important to bear in mind that 
the R2P is intended to devise a framework for intervention without 
institutional approbation. Therefore, the plasticity of any norms proposed 
will necessarily be significant, given that they may be employed by a 
vast array of self-interested norm interpreters, namely States. In light of 
this fact, the drafters of the R2P ought to have employed language 
grounded in existing legal concepts, referring where possible, to specific 
interpretations thereof, in order to ‘cage’ the terms employed. Instead, as 
noted, they embraced a novel nomenclature that was essentially rootless, 
leaving the interpretation – and ultimately the meaning – thereof to be 
determined by the whimsy of individual States. This is particularly 
regrettable, since the few nods to restrained drafting within the R2P 
Report merely serve to exclude gross and systematic human rights abuses 
from the threshold criteria, ensuring that great swathes of vulnerable 
people are prevented from ever benefitting from the doctrine, while 
  
 45. J von Stein, “The Engines of Compliance,” in JL Dunoff and MA Pollack 
(eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: 
The State of the Art, New York: Cambridge University Press (2012) 
 46. For a discussion of NATO’s justifications, see MC Pugh, Pal Waheguru & S 
Singh, The United Nations & Regional Security: Europe and Beyond, Boulder, Colorado, 
Lynne Rienner (2003). 
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leaving it to the States to determine the interpretation of the conditions of 
when ‘responsibility’ might shift from the State to the international 
community. 
The choice of terminology is reflective of a general naïveté on the part 
of the Report’s drafters, illustrated through the concept of ‘good 
international citizenship,’ repeatedly referred to in the Report, which 
posits that it is in the interest of every State to intervene anywhere in the 
world when serious crises emerge, due to the interdependence of the 
world community. This notion is used to counterbalance opportunism 
and self-interest. However, the falsehood of such a doctrine should be 
immediately apparent. We are not likely to see South Korean troops in 
Eastern Ukraine, nor Danes in the Western Sahara. This fact renders the 
idea, proposed by the Report whereby the Permanent Members of the 
Security Council refrain from exercising their veto unless vital national 
interests are at stake rather fanciful. It will usually be the powerful States 
(or their close allies) that will intervene in such crises; one could thus 
argue that every crisis worldwide concerns the vital interests of the 
Permanent Members. It is, after all, their role to look after international 
peace and security. The Report’s drafters admit that “[t]hose who 
advocate action to protect human rights must inevitably come to grips 
with the nature of political self-interest to achieve good ends.”47 
However, little heed is paid by the report to the inherent conflict between 
self-interest and ‘good international citizenship’ that will arise in many 
cases. 
III. “A VALIANT ATTEMPT”/ “MORE HARM THAN GOOD?” 
The main tenets of the R2P are certainly susceptible to a good degree 
of criticism. However, the implementation of the initiative was to give 
rise to further complications. A framework drafted to revolutionize the 
way the world thought about sovereignty was transformed into 
something the Report’s drafters never intended. Some of this was 
perhaps foreseeable. Elements of the R2P were certainly overly utopian. 
  
 47. ICISS, Research, Bibliography, Background (to the R2P Report) (2001), 140. 
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However, the Report’s implementation was overtaken by real-world 
circumstances. 
A. A Series of Unfortunate Events 
The temporal ‘zemblanity’48 of the September 11th attacks was 
undoubtedly important in how the R2P Report was received 
internationally. The attacks against the United States were characterized 
as an armed attack, triggering the threshold of self-defense. This fact was 
affirmed by Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373, passed in the 
immediate aftermath of 11 September 2001.49 These resolutions were 
subsequently employed by the US in waging its so-called ‘war on terror,’ 
classifying the terrorists’ activities as a threat to international peace and 
security, thus invoking the right to use of force under both Article 51 and 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and employing these legal bases as a 
casus belli for the invasion of Afghanistan. 
However, even before the true implications of the events of 
September 2001 became clear, there was recognition on the part of the 
report’s drafters that political will would be an important obstacle to be 
overcome before R2P could garner acceptance. Nonetheless, Evans and 
Sahnoun struck a positive tone, noting that”[t]oo often more time is spent 
lamenting the absence of political will than on analyzing its ingredients 
and how to mobilize them.”50 The mobilization of State opinion was 
undertaken in earnest, and one could argue, perhaps even too earnestly. 
The effort to reach consensus at the 2005 World Summit inevitably 
involved significant compromises with regard to the original tenets of the 
Report. The view of the R2P’s proponents was that a limited degree of 
progress was preferable to none at all. 
It was immediately clear that the Permanent Members were unlikely 
to countenance any dilution of their veto power. As a result, the 
  
 48. The word zemblanity is often described as the antonym of serendipity. The 
term’s origin comes from Novaya Zemlya, the Russian Arctic archipelago, the discovery 
of which was supposedly an unfortunate accident. 
 49. Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373, available at  
http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2001.shtml (last visited Oct. 28, 2014). 
 50. Evans and Sahnounm, supra note 13, at 109. 
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‘unreasonable veto’ component was quietly discarded. In addition, the 
revised framework entailed that the Security Council would, regardless 
of veto use, remain the final arbiter concerning uses of force. This 
represented a significant setback, effectively rendering a ‘future Kosovo’ 
both illegal and illegitimate under the framework as adopted. Despite 
bullish rhetoric on the part of proponents of the R2P in the wake of the 
2005 World Summit Outcome Document and UN Security Council 
Resolution 1674 of 2006, it is nonetheless the case that both endorsed a 
mutation of the doctrine that had strayed a great distance from the 2001 
Report. As Bellamy has noted, “[p]erhaps the most worrying 
development is that in attempting to forge a consensus, the ICISS and its 
supporters sacrificed almost all of the key elements of their twin 
strategies.”51 This represents a depressing conclusion for champions of 
the R2P as originally constituted, but is indicative of the extent of the 
wrangling that was needed to achieve consensus and placate the 
Permanent Members in particular. 
Further to the above, the legal effect of the World Summit Outcome 
Document is far from concrete. A good deal of its rhetoric is purely 
aspirational, not amounting to definitive obligations for States. 
Resolution 1674, adopted outside Chapter VII of the UN Charter, was no 
improvement, as it lacked the normative force to impact upon the 
Security Council’s unfettered discretion to decide on issues concerning 
the use of force in any way whatsoever. 
B. Scruples and Exploitation 
A further problem that beset the R2P was one that the Report’s 
drafters had spent a good deal of time discussing, namely abuse. This 
was a preoccupation that applied to many of the formulas devised to 
provide for humanitarian intervention, and the R2P was no exception, 
although Thomas G. Weiss argued that this was less of a concern than 
ensuring that the United States did not secure backing for preventive or 
pre-emptive wars.52 In the event, the R2P in fact proved to be closely 
  
 51. Bellamy, supra note 25, at 169. 
 52. T.G. Weiss, ‘The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to 
Protect in a Unipolar Era’, SECURITY DIALOGUE, (35) 2004-2, 137. 
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related to both concepts. The main tenets of the Report were employed, 
inter alia, by Fenstein and Slaughter to develop a corollary – the ‘Duty to 
Prevent’ acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by States without 
internal checks on their power.53 It was quite clear that such a doctrine 
could serve as an excuse for pre-emptive war. In addition, although not 
uniquely concerning the R2P, it is germane to note how the myriad 
justificatory frameworks for humanitarian intervention advanced post-
1999 were, in time, used by commentators to justify the 2003 US-led 
invasion of Iraq.54 It was quite clear that the principles underpinning the 
R2P were deeply susceptible to the most wanton abuse. 
IV. TIME FOR A CHANGE OR MORE OF THE SAME? GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
OF LAW AND THE R2P 
A. The Letter of the Law (reprise) 
As noted previously, one central criticism of the Responsibility to 
Protect initiative is that it made little effort to engage with positive 
international law as it stood at the time that the ICISS Report was 
drafted, rather opting for a utopian model based upon shaky premises 
regarding ‘good international citizenship.’ I am not the first to make such 
an observation. However, it is, perhaps, worthwhile to dwell on the fact 
that the R2P failed to adequately assess not just the UN Charter regime, 
and the interpretation of the ICJ thereof, but also customary law, ius 
cogens, and general principles of law. The foregoing reads like a laundry 
list of sources of public international law, and yet, with regard to the 
final source mentioned, namely general principles, the R2P was certainly 
far from unique. Overlooking general principles has long since been the 
mode du jour in international legal scholarship. The last comprehensive 
study of the category in the English language was undertaken by Bin 
  
 53. L Fenstein and A-M Slaughter, ‘A Duty to Prevent’ (2004) 83 FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS 136, 149. 
 54. F Tesón, ‘Eight Principles of Humanitarian Intervention’ (2006) 5 JOURNAL 
OF MILITARY ETHICS 93. 
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Cheng in 1953.55 The fact over six decades have passed since then 
reflects the relative level of interest in the normative category. Yet, such 
neglect would seem, on the face of it, rather unwarranted. Article 38(1) 
of the ICJ Statute – generally accepted as the authoritative encapsulation 
of the sources of international law, and itself an integral component of 
the UN Charter56 – provides that general principles shall constitute one of 
the three principal sources of international law, alongside treaty and 
custom. Moreover, there would seem to be no explicit hierarchy between 
the three.  
B. Unpacking the Humanitarian Intervention Conundrum 
Despite such consistent neglect, however, as shall be demonstrated 
anon, general principles undeniably represent an important source of 
legal rights and obligations. A preliminary question poses itself, 
however, namely, how are such principles relevant to the humanitarian 
intervention debate? The answer may be demonstrated by unpacking the 
essential components of the debate, and thereafter by reference to a 
historical analogy. The question of humanitarian intervention may be 
described as one brought about by the stagnation of law. The fact that the 
UN Charter rules governing the use of force by States are insusceptible 
to reform – due to the lack of will on the part of certain powerful 
stakeholders and the jus cogens nature of the norms themselves – gives 
rise to problems. The moral consensus – and indeed, the normative 
corpus of international law itself – has evolved since the UN Charter was 
drafted. The inability of the latter to engage with human rights norms in 
an adequate manner results in what is commonly perceived as a manifest 
injustice occurring when States engage in gross and systematic human 
rights abuses against their own citizens. This is despite the fact that there 
exists an identifiable and potentially effective solution – namely 
  
 55. B Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and 
Tribunals (Cambridge, Grotius, 1953, republished unrevised in 1987). It is worth noting, 
however, that a generalist text has recently been published in German. See P-Y Marro,  
Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze des Völkerrechts: zur Verfassungsordnung des  
Völkerrechts (Dissertation Zurich, Schulthess, 2010). 
 56. See U.N. Charter art. 92.  
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humanitarian intervention. The problem is that the latter is not legally 
permitted.  
The kernel of the conundrum, then, lies in the stagnation and 
inflexibility of the legal framework. The fact is, however, that is this is 
not a problem that is unique to international law. Rather, domestic legal 
systems have, in the past, found themselves confronted with broadly 
similar systemic blockages, whereby, for one reason or another, the law 
failed to evolve with the prevailing moral consensus, or where manifest 
injustices resulted from a rigid application of the letter of the law. In this 
regard, it is somewhat surprising that neither the drafters of the R2P, nor 
the various scholars who tackled the problem of humanitarian 
intervention post-Kosovo, thought to have reference to the solutions 
employed in such situations. 
To use but one example, in 16
th
 century Tudor England, a situation of 
legal stagnation also arose. The problem was principally one of 
unadaptable procedure. In order to commence a case, plaintiffs were 
obliged to submit “writs.” These writs could only be procured for 
specific offences, such as trespass and trespass to the person. If the 
plaintiff’s case fell outside the scope of a prescribed writ, he could not be 
granted compensation for any injury vested upon him or his property. 
Faced with an inflexible legal system, resourceful lawyers would attempt 
to ‘shoehorn’ wrongs committed into the framework of existing writs. 
However, since the legislation was quite specific concerning the 
elements necessary for the procurement of a given writ, such actions 
were generally in vain. This resulted in a situation where many parties 
who had suffered an injustice were unable to claim any compensation 
whatsoever. In addition, those who managed to frame their actions within 
the scope of an existing writ faced an additional problem, namely that the 
writs prescribed that the only compensation obtainable was generally in 
the form of monetary damages. This ignored the fact that in many cases, 
such compensation was either insufficient (since the limits thereof were 
determined by statute) or unsuitable (when the owner might have 
preferred restitutio in integrum or specific performance of an obligation 
as a remedy). The legislator was entirely indisposed toward any legal 
reform, and it was clear that this situation was unlikely to change. Here, 
again, legal stagnation and rigidity resulted in recognizably unjust 
results, despite the fact that an identifiable and potentially effective 
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solution existed, namely the creation of new writs and the admission of 
new remedies to existing writs. 
Parallels between writs in 16
th
 century Tudor England, and 
humanitarian intervention in 21
st
 century public international law might 
seem rather fanciful on the face of it. However, both situations arose 
from legal rigidity and stagnation. It is therefore germane to examine 
how the problem was solved in the former context.  
The importance of finding a solution to the inflexibility of common 
law writs was brought into sharp relief by the near-anarchy that followed 
the War of the Roses, due to the need to restore order without being 
restricted by antiquated procedures. 57 Ultimately, a solution was found 
within the common law itself. It had long been possible to engage in a 
special appeal ‘to the King’s conscience’ by way of an individual 
petition, when the bare application of the common law had resulted in a 
manifest injustice. The King, unfettered by statute, would then decide 
whether to entertain the plaintiff’s submission, and if so, what remedy to 
award. This system reposed upon the medieval precept that the monarch, 
who is not the subject of written laws, retains power to impose remedies 
to enforce a natural obligation where positive law is unable to do so. 
With the progressive development of the commercial economy, cases 
of injustice in the face of writs abounded, and the attractiveness of resort 
to individual appeals to the monarch increased exponentially. The King, 
overburdened, delegated authority for individual appeals to a law officer 
called the Lord Chancellor. However, dealing with such appeals quickly 
became too time-consuming even for a full-time legal functionary. A 
separate system of ‘courts of conscience’ – also known as courts of 
equity – was thus established. Such courts functioned in parallel to 
common law courts until the Union of Judicature (Acts), 1873 & 1875, 
combined the two jurisdictions. The chief precept of the Acts was that 
where conflicts between equity and the law might arise, equity should 
prevail. Ever since, equity has operated as a softening influence upon 
legal rigidity, both in England, and in other common law jurisdictions. 
  
 57. Stuart E. Prall, The Development of Equity in Tudor England, 8 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 1 (1964).  
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While equitable jurisdiction developed as a means of mitigating legal 
rigidity, even prior to the Judicature Acts, its functioning was dependent 
upon the framework provided by the common law. In the words of Lord 
Denning, “[e]quity comes in, true to form, to mitigate the rigours of strict 
law.”58 As Greene MR pointed out, in common law, if such injustice 
leading to a claim in equity exists, “it must be shown to have an ancestry 
founded in history and in the practice and precedents of the courts 
administering equity jurisdiction.”59 Such a formulation was necessary to 
guard against wanton subjectivity on the part of judges when employing 
equitable doctrines. As equitable jurisprudence developed, aided by stare 
decisis, certain general principles of law began to emerge. Too broad to 
be described as rules, such principles were described via ‘maxims,’ 
crafted through generations of equitable decisions, thereby establishing a 
guiding quasi-precedent upon which future judgments might be based. 
These maxims prescribed the legal principles according to which equity 
was to be applied. However, an element of flexibility in the exercise of 
such principles was necessarily retained, since, after all, equity was 
intended to be tailored to the justice of the individual case, and any more 
steadfast rules could themselves have become stagnant and rigid, thereby 
provoking the very problem they were intended to solve. Nonetheless, 
the development of such principles meant that any charge of arbitrariness 
concerning the doctrines of equity was necessarily answered.60 
C. Equity and General Principles – A Worldwide Phenomenon 
While the common law history of the equity’s development is oft-
quoted and well-known, other examples of equity’s development in 
domestic systems are abundant. The modalities of this development are 
  
 58. Crabb v. Arun, [1975] 3 W.L.R. 847 (D.C.) at 865, Ch. 179 at 187 (Lord 
Denning M.R.) (Eng.).  
 59. Diplock v. Wintle (In Re Diplock), [1948] Ch. 465 (A.C.) at 481-82 (Lord 
Green M.R.) (Eng.).  
 60. This had been a significant problem for the fledgling doctrine, with one 
commentator comparing the extent of equitable relief that one was likely to receive from 
the Courts of Chancery to the length of the Lord Chancellor’s foot, i.e., that such a 
measure was arbitrary and unrelated to the justice of the case. JOHN SELDEN, THE TABLE-
TALK OF JOHN SELDEN / WITH NOTES BY DAVID IRVING 62-63 (2010).  
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divergent from one jurisdiction to another. However, what is remarkable 
is that the general principles that emerge in such instances are 
comparatively uniform.61 The very concept of equity has its roots in 
Greek and Roman philosophy. Aristotle described equity (epieikea) as 
“better than that error that arises from the absoluteness of the statement. 
And this is the nature of the equitable, a correction of the law where it is 
defective owing to its universality.”62 Since statutory law could not 
account for every circumstance, equity would act as a corrective in favor 
of justice. In the Roman context, Cicero dubbed equity (aequitas) the 
spirit of justice, which may mold the law according to right reason.63 
Although the Tudor common law was not directly influenced by such 
writings, it is remarkable that equity as it eventually played out in the 
English context bore a strong similarity to the Greek and Roman 
conceptions thereof. 
Elsewhere, notions of equity found favor in a wide array of legal 
systems. Per the codification model adopted by continental European 
jurisdictions, equitable provisions were inserted directly into the codes. 
In this regard, one may, for example, draw attention to Article 1134, 
alinéa 3 of the French Civil Code, by virtue of which parties are under a 
duty to exercise their contractual obligations in good faith. This extends 
to the prohibition of the abuse of rights (théorie de l’abus du droit), 
achieved by judicial ‘stretching’ of the various Code civil provisions, 
stipulating that rights may be abused if used not for their owner’s 
interest, but as a means of harming others. This stretching of the law, 
derogating from unthinking application of rights and obligations where 
to do so would result in an injustice, bears a strong similarity to the role 
of equity in the common law.64 Section 242 of the German Bürgerliches 
  
 61. See generally BURKE, supra note 11, at 127-203.  
 62. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, ch. 10 (Joe Sachs ed., London:  
Philosophical Library Series 2004) (c. 384 B.C.E.).  
 63. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, ON THE REPUBLIC ON THE LAWS 42 (Clinton W. 
Keyes trans., William Heinemann Ltd. 1977).  
 64. B. Jeanneau, The Reception of Equity in French Public and Private Law, in 
EQUITY IN THE WORLD’S LEGAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 223-24 (Ralph A. 
Newman ed., Établissements Émile Bruylant 1973); see also E.H. Perreau, Origine et 
Développement de la Théorie de L’abus du Droit, REVUE GÉNERALE DU DROIT 481 
(1913).  
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Gesetzbuch contains similar notions, with a rather innocuous-sounding 
paragraph concerning good faith having been stretched far beyond a 
literal interpretation thereof. Courts in fact often use Section 242 as an 
‘escape clause’ from the rigidity of the written law, combining Section 
242 with the notion of Unzumutbarkeit (disproportionate burden, 
unreasonableness) to justify derogations from the lex lata in the interests 
of justice.65 Elsewhere, I have explored equitable general principles in 
the world’s legal systems, building upon Newman’s 1973 edited volume, 
concluding that one may trace strong similarities between jurisdictions as 
diverse as England, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the 
United States, China, Japan, Scotland, Italy, Spain, Argentina, Sweden, 
and a number of Muslim countries.66 While the historical development of 
law in the various mentioned jurisdictions is distinct and dissimilar in a 
great number of ways, it is nonetheless the case that principles such as 
good faith, abus de droit, the doctrine of unjust enrichment, the doctrine 
of reasonable expectations (and estoppel), and the prioritization of 
substance over form have found almost universal acceptance in one form 
or another throughout the world’s developed legal systems.67 
D. General Principles of International Law 
In the international legal context, both Grotius and Pufendorf reserved 
an important space for equity within their respective conceptions of 
international law, including its potential use as a corrective mechanism.68 
However, they both held that ‘bare’ equity was ill-advised as a doctrine 
for the regulation of inter-state relations, and that, as such, equity should 
be applied with some degree of restraint. As a result, it is perhaps 
  
 65. U. Diedrichsen, Principles of Equity in German Civil Law, in EQUITY IN THE  
WORLD’S LEGAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 279 (Ralph A. Newman ed.,  
Établissements Émile Bruylant 1973).  
 66. See BURKE, supra note 11, at 198-99. 
 67. See Justice M. White, Equity – A General Principle of Law Recognised by 
Civilised Nations?, 4 QUEENSLAND L. J. 103, 103-07 (2004).  
 68. See HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE (1715) (explaining the 
laws and claims of nature and nations, and the principle points that relate either to public 
government or the conduct of private life); SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, THE LAW OF 
NATURE AND NATIONS (1749).  
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unsurprising that, in order to counter charges of subjectivity, rather than 
an overarching conception of justice, firm principles emerged in early 
international arbitral practice that mirrored those that had been received 
into the various domestic legal systems.69 
Concerns about the role – if any – that should be accorded to equity 
and general principles of law surfaced during the lengthy discussions 
which took place in The Hague in 1920 amongst a panel of renowned 
legal scholars, selected by the League of Nations to advise on the 
creation of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). An 
important question that arose in the course of these discussions 
concerned the sources of law that could be applied by the putative court. 
While treaties and customary law were comparatively uncontroversial, 
the role that general principles and equity might play was a matter of 
some dispute. A Kulturkampf was visible, as in many civil law systems, 
the common law idea of a separate conception of equity was perceived as 
rather alien. The continental taste for codification was resistant to any 
such conception, though there was nonetheless a recognition that through 
the ‘general clauses’ inserted into civil law codes, many of the principles 
would, in practice, be rather similar in nature.70 
After detailed debate on the content of this category, it was eventually 
framed as “the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.” 
Although the majority of the learned committee of jurists was ready to 
concede that equity would play a role in judicial decisions, they were not 
prepared to list it as a separate free-standing source of law, given its 
different connotations in different legal systems.71 The formulation 
arrived at for the Statute of the PCIJ is identical to that in Article 38(I)c 
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which is an 
integral component of the United Nations Charter.72 This amounts to the 
  
 69. CHRISTOPHER R. ROSSI, EQUITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A LEGAL REALIST 
APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL DECISION MAKING 9-10 (1993).  
 70. WOLFGANGG. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 543-45 (Columbia Univ. Press 
1967). 
 71. P Van Dijk, ‘Equity: A Recognised Manifestation of International Law?’, in 
M Bos, & W Heere, (eds.), International Law and its Sources (The Netherlands: Kluwer 
Law and Taxation, 1989) 1; 11. 
 72. See UN Charter, Article 92. 
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authoritative description of the sources of international law, and is 
binding upon all Member States of the United Nations. 
The formulation adopted was found to have normative consequences, 
when in the years and decades that followed, first the PCIJ and then the 
ICJ made use of a number of such general principles of law in their 
judgments, and separate and dissenting opinions. However, as 
Schwarzenberger has noted, “[i]nternational courts and tribunals fight 
shy of laying bare the equitable and common-sense reasons on which, in 
fact, their interpretative work is based.”73 This is above all true with 
regard to general principles. Few instances have occurred where the PCIJ 
and ICJ have explicitly had recourse to the normative category. 
Remarkably, the ICJ has only ever referred explicitly to general 
principles once in its judgments, and this was to rule out the application 
of a particular legal principle in the circumstances rather than to apply a 
general principle of law,74 though such principles have been more 
frequently referred to in dissenting opinions and ad hoc judgments.75 
Such a trend is curious, given that it is common ground amongst scholars 
that there exists no explicit hierarchy between treaty, custom and general 
principles. Perhaps the reluctance to explicitly refer to general principles 
may be explained by reference to the proliferation of treaties, meaning 
  
 73. 1 Georg Schwarzenberger, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 153 (4th ed. 
1960). 
 74. South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Judgment, 1966 
I.C.J. 6, 47 (July 18). 
 75. See Lighthouses in Crete and Samos, Judgment, 1937 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B) No. 
71, at 137–38  (Oct. 8) (separate opinion of Judge Séfériadès); see also International 
Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 128, 148 (July 11) (separate 
opinion of Sir McNair); see also Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), Preliminary 
Objection, 1952 I.C.J. 93, 161 (July 22) (dissenting opinion of Judge Levi Carneiro); see 
also Application of the Convention of 1902 Governing the Guardianship of Infants (Neth. 
v. Swed.), Judgment, 1958 I.C.J. 55, 107 (Nov. 28) (separate opinion of Judge Moreno 
Quintana); see also Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), Judgment, 
1960 I.C.J. 66-67 (Apr. 12) (separate opinion of Judge Wellington Koo); see also Temple 
of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. 6, 42-43 (June 15) 
(dissenting opinion of Judge Alfaro); see also Legality of the Treat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 308-09 (July 8) (declaration of Judge 
Fleischhauer); see also Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161,  ¶ 66, 74 (Nov. 6) 
(separate opinion of Judge Simma). 
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that there is usually a lex specialis, which can decide a legal dispute, 
obviating the necessity for recourse to broader principles. Perhaps the 
PCIJ and ICJ were wary of employing a norm less dependent upon State 
consent than treaty or custom. Whatever the cause, both courts abstained 
from referring to such principles explicitly, or calling them by name. 
Nonetheless, the PCIJ and ICJ have had recourse to a number of such 
principles, albeit in what may be termed a rather quiet manner. This has 
invited criticism, even within the ICJ itself, with Buergenthal J critically 
opining that “rules of international law cannot be brought [into legal 
disputes] through the back door.”76 Despite the qualms of Judge 
Buergenthal, however, it would seem as though the back door is indeed 
the most frequent entry point for general principles of law into the 
judgments and opinions of the successive World Courts.77  
Here is not the place for an exhaustive enumeration of every occasion 
upon which the PCIJ and ICJ have had recourse to general principles of 
law. However, it is perhaps useful to have reference to a number of 
principles that have been employed by the successive courts, insofar as 
such reference demonstrates their proximity to domestic general 
principles of law, and more particularly, to principles of equity 
recognized by a plurality of domestic legal systems. 
In the Chorzów Factory (jurisdiction) judgment, the PCIJ invoked the 
nullus commodum capere de sua iniuria propria (no one may profit by 
his own misdeeds) principle in order to confirm the decision that it had 
reached.78 In the Jurisdiction of the Danzig Courts Advisory Opinion, the 
same principle was applied. Here, it was held that a State could not plead 
the fact that it had failed to implement its international legal obligations 
within its domestic law as a defense to rights that might arise by virtue of 
  
 76. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 281 at ¶ 28 (Nov. 6) (separate 
opinion of Judge Buergenthal). 
 77. Perhaps we should not be so surprised in this regard. Indeed, the PCIJ and 
ICJ are not unique in this regard. As French has noted, “there are numerous examples of 
where a tribunal relies upon ‘other’ law, but without any clear attempt to clarify either 
what it is doing or why it has done so.” See Duncan French, Treaty Interpretation and the 
Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules, 55 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 281, 292 (2006). 
 78. Factory at Chorzów, Claim for Indemnity, 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 9, at 25-
27 (July 26). 
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such obligations.79 This case was followed by Reed J of the ICJ in his 
dissenting opinion in the Interpretation of Peace Treaties Advisory 
Opinion. According to Reed, no government ought to be allowed to raise 
such legal objections which would “let such a government profit from its 
own wrong.” Reed also raised the doctrine of estoppel, as a general 
principle of international law, to bolster his argument.80 
In the Chorzów Factory (Merits) case, the PCIJ based its judgment on 
the principle ubi ius, ubi remedium, that is, that equity will not suffer a 
wrong to be without a remedy. The Court stated that “[it is] a general 
conception of law that any breach of an engagement involves an 
obligation to make reparation.”81 The 1970 Barcelona Traction, Light 
and Power Company Limited case82 elaborated further upon this 
principle, with the ICJ holding that for reasons of equity, a State should 
be able to set aside certain provisions of diplomatic formalism, in order 
to exercise diplomatic protection over its nationals. However, in 
declining locus standi to Belgium, the ICJ outlined the practical 
difficulties in this particular case, holding that this principle could only 
come into play in extremis, and that in cases sound and settled rules of 
law are involved, this principle could not operate, since to do so might 
have “opened the door to legal anarchy.”83 
The Chorzów Factory (Merits) case is also notable for the dissenting 
opinion of Ehrlich J, who, commenting on the principle of good faith in 
international law, held that the principle ex re sed non ex nomine is a 
component of the good faith principle. This principle encapsulates the 
  
 79. Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 1928 P.C.I.J. (Ser. B) 
No. 15, at 26–27 (Mar. 3). 
 80. Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, 
Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. No. 8, 244 (July 18) (dissenting opinion of Judge Reed). 
 81. Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 17, at 
29 (Sept. 13). The Court here repeatedly stated its preference for full and adequate 
restitution wherever possible – restitutio in integrum – but warned that measures needed 
to be taken to avoid compensating twice for any one wrong, echoing the English common 
law maxim that ‘equity guards against double portions.’. 
 82. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd (Belg. v Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 
(Feb. 5). 
 83. Shabtai Rosenne, The Position of the International Court of Justice on the 
Foundations of the Principle of Equity in International Law, in FORTY YEARS OF THE 
INT’L COURT OF JUSTICE 102 (Arie Bloed & Peiter Van Dijk eds., 1988). 
2015] Responsibility to Protect & the Future of Humanitarian Intervention 665 
 
prioritization of substance over form, stating that in cases of disputes, 
regard shall be had to the real substance of a particular legal transaction, 
and not the mere formalities pertaining thereto.84 The Barcelona Traction 
and Diversion of Water from the River Meuse85 cases also demonstrate, 
albeit implicitly, the willingness of the ICJ and PCIJ to be unconstrained 
by formal criteria if such criteria will amount to the frustration of 
substantive justice. In the Diversion of Water from the River Meuse case, 
the PCIJ excused Belgium’s breach of its international legal obligations 
on the basis that its co-contractor, the Netherlands, had failed to keep its 
side of the bargain. 
In the Serbian and Brazilian Loans case,86 the doctrine of estoppel 
was applied, in much the same manner in which it applies in common 
law. In this particular instance, it was decided that a case of estoppel did 
not arise, as the representation had not been unequivocal, and as there 
had been no change of position on the part of the debtor state. The 
doctrine was applied with full vigor in the 1962 Temple of Preah Vihear 
case.87 The 1908 acceptance as accurate by Thailand of a map, and 50 
years of subsequent practice, failing to contest the resulting frontier, 
constituted an act of acquiescence. The component elements of 
assurance, reliance (change of position) and detriment were fulfilled; 
ergo an estoppel arose, and Thailand was prevented from contesting the 
frontier it had accepted. As noted above, the opinion of Judge Reed in 
the Interpretation of the Peace Treaties Advisory Opinion also referred 
  
 84. Factory at Chorzów, supra note 81, at 87 (dissenting opinion of Judge 
Ehrlich). 
 85. Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Neth. V. Belg.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) 
No. 70 (June 28).  This case is often cited as the high water mark for equity in 
international law, and is undoubtedly one of the most important cases in this regard. See 
C. WILFRED JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 320–24  (1964); 
see also Edward McWhinney, Equity in International Law,  in EQUITY IN THE WORLD’S 
LEGAL SYSTEMS 581 (Ralph A. Newman ed., 1973); see also M.W. Janis, Equity and 
International Law: The Comment in the Tentative Draft, 57 TUL. L. REV. 80, 80, 86 
(1982). 
 86. Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (Fr. v. Yugo.), 1929 
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 20, p. 39. 
 87. Temple of Preah Vihear, supra note 75.  
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to the estoppel principle, as did the separate, concurring, opinion of Vice-
President Weeramantry in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case.88 
Finally, special attention should be paid to the opinion of Judge 
Hudson in the Diversion of Water from the River Meuse case.89 Here, in a 
case involving the breach of reciprocal obligations with respect to the 
erection of international waterways, Judge Hudson stated: 
It would seem to be an important principle of equity that where two 
parties have assumed an identical or reciprocal obligation, one party 
which is engaged in a continuing non-performance of that obligation 
should not be permitted to take advantage of a similar non- 
performance of that obligation by the other party. The principle finds 
expression in the so-called maxims of equity which exercised great 
influence in the creative period of the Anglo-American law. Some of 
these maxims are, ‘equality is equity, ‘he who seeks equity must do 
equity’. ...a very similar principle was received into Roman Law. 
Here, Judge Hudson reaffirmed the conception of general principles 
of international law, or a subset thereof, at least, as bearing a strong 
similarity to the maxims of equity developed by the common law, and 
their equivalent principles in Roman law. Further, in mentioning 
“equality is equity” and “he who seeks equity must do equity,” Judge 
Hudson noted that equitable doctrines would not become a tool for the 
unscrupulous. Rather, the employment thereof must necessarily be for 
the benefit of the party seeking to achieve substantive justice. This may 
also be described via the maxim “he who comes to equity must come 
with clean hands.” 
The above examples unequivocally demonstrate the reception of 
equitable doctrines, via general principles of law, into the normative 
corpus of public international law. There are a number of further 
examples in this regard, but explaining them all in detail, or indeed 
devising a ‘test’ to determine which general principles are generally 
accepted by a broad plurality of domestic legal systems and might be ripe 
for transposition to international law, exceeds the scope of the present 
  
 88. Gabčíkovo-Nagymoros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 3, 7 (Feb. 5). 
 89. Diversion of Water from Meuse, supra note 85, at 81. 
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study. What is intended herein, rather, is to illustrate the fact that these 
principles, forming part of the prescriptive framework of international 
law, may be relevant to a broad number of legal questions, not least that 
of humanitarian intervention, something which the drafters of the R2P 
Report entirely failed to consider. 
E. Harnessing the Power of General Principles – A Real 
Responsibility to Protect 
As noted above, in the Chorzów Factory, Jurisdiction of the Danzig 
Courts and Interpretation of the Peace Treaties cases, the principle that a 
State may not profit from its own misdeeds (nullus commodum capere de 
sua iniuria propria) was upheld. If we apply this to the context of a 
typical case in which humanitarian intervention may be called for, we 
can imagine a State that has signed up to international human rights 
treaties or has failed to persistently object to the formation of customary 
law on human rights protection – in essence, all States meet this 
threshold – that is engaging in gross and systematic human rights abuses 
against its own citizenry. Much like in the Danzig Courts case, it is in 
breach of its own international obligations, many of which are ius cogens 
and thus apply erga omnes. However, like in the Danzig Courts case, the 
State in question is benefitting from the fact that it has failed to ensure 
that its obligations are respected domestically. In such circumstances, its 
fellow members of the international community may consider themselves 
doubly wronged, firstly by virtue of the breach of the erga omnes 
obligations, and secondly due to the fact that the State in question would 
seem to be attempting to profit from its own misdeeds. 
Following from the above, resort should be had to the fact that “[it is] 
a general conception of law, that any breach of an engagement involves 
an obligation to make reparation.”90Per the maxim ubi ius, ubi 
remedium, upheld, inter alia in the Barcelona Traction case, the State in 
  
 90. Factory at Chorzów, supra note 81, at 29, 49.  
The Court here repeatedly stated its preference for full and adequate restitution wherever 
possible – restitutio in integrum – but warned that measures needed to be taken to avoid 
compensating twice for any one wrong, echoing the English common law maxim that 
‘equity guards against double portions’. 
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question is under an obligation to make good to its fellow States for its 
infractions. While no remedy would seem to be forthcoming in such 
circumstances, assuming that the UN Security Council is not prepared to 
act, it is well to bear in mind that that the principle ex re sed non ex 
nomine was also upheld in the Barcelona Traction case, as well as being 
referred to in both the Meuse and Chorzów Factory (Merits) cases. This 
principle entails that formal strictures may, on occasion be set aside 
when the justice of the case so demands. In Barcelona Traction, for 
example, it was held that diplomatic protection – a doctrine crafted for 
the protection of certain natural persons while the latter were abroad – 
could also be exercised in favor of corporate entities. This was important 
in the context of achieving justice, insofar as otherwise, companies 
operating in foreign jurisdictions could have been subjected to 
unreasonable levels of prejudice. However, extending the law in this 
manner went far beyond the boundaries of previously available remedies. 
While the Court would not take the principle further – allowing Belgium 
to sue on behalf of a Canadian company despite the fact that the latter 
had a good number of Belgian shareholders – this was because it was 
dealing with what it described as a sound and settled rule of law. In the 
context of humanitarian intervention, one could also argue that the 
Charter regime on the use of force is sound and settled legal framework. 
However, such a position ignores the fact that this regime predates the 
advent of much of the modern human rights corpus, or certainly its 
elevation to the status of ius cogens and erga omnes norms. Thus, there 
would certainly seem to exist scope for looking to the substance of the 
situation rather than the form, and for resort thereafter to the principle 
ubi ius, ubi remedium. If a remedy is required to put an end to an 
ongoing breach of the international obligations of a particular State, 
particularly when the latter is profiting by its own misdeeds, and no 
remedy exists in international law, the operation of this principle and the 
case law of the PCIJ and ICJ would suggest that international law will 
permit the creation of such a remedy. 
In addition, it is germane to have regard to the doctrine of estoppel in 
international law, as upheld, inter alia, in the Temple of Preah Vihear 
case. The doctrine of estoppel relies on the tripartite condition of 
assurance, reliance and detriment. In the present context, an assurance is 
furnished by any State which either ratifies human rights treaties, or 
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which refrains from persistently objecting to the formation of customary 
human rights norms in international law. This criterion is effectively 
satisfied by all States. The assurance thus furnished entails that those 
persons on the State’s territory will be provided with a specific level of 
human rights protection. The element of reliance may be divined from 
the behavior of the citizens of the State, who love their lives free from 
fear of abuse. In addition, an element of reliance on the part of the other 
States in the international community is evident, since they rely upon the 
assurance in a number of ways. In modern times, engaging with States 
that commit gross human rights abuses against their own citizenry is 
perceived as unacceptable by the people of a good many States. Evidence 
of this is provided by the distaste that arose in Western Europe and North 
America concerning the maintenance of friendly relations with the South 
African apartheid government. This distaste eventually led to a 
deterioration in relations between South Africa and the West during the 
1980s, despite the obvious utility of the former for the latter as an arms 
producer and foe of Communism. Evidence of reliance upon assurances 
pertaining to human rights may also be garnered from the drawn-out 
process surrounding Turkey’s potential accession to the European Union. 
One of the major stumbling blocks in this regard has been Turkey’s 
human rights record. Turkey’s potential accession would only be 
countenanced were certain specific assurances pertaining to human rights 
to be furnished. The final element, namely detriment, is clearly suffered, 
firstly by the State’s citizens, who are subjected to gross human rights 
abuses, and by the other States of the international community, which 
have changed their position and their policy toward the abusing State on 
the basis of the assurances furnished by the latter, and which are no 
longer able to rely upon such assurances. It should further be underlined 
that ius cogens norms pertaining to human rights protection, such as the 
prohibition of genocide, are owed erga omnes, and every State is thus 
entitled to view itself as wronged (or, to feel detriment) when such 
obligations are infringed upon. In such a case, when the tripartite test of 
assurance, reliance and detriment is satisfied, the offending State will be 
estopped from denying the veracity of the assurance given. In ideal 
circumstances, this would be ordered by an injunction of the ICJ, as was 
discussed in the Serbian Loans case. However, due to the rather limited 
jurisdiction of the Court, this scenario is rather unlikely. As a result, we 
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are faced in such circumstances with an unenforceable estoppel. This 
procedural cul-de-sac can be cured by reference to the maxim ubi ius, ubi 
remedium. The impotence of the ICJ entails that an effective remedy 
must be found elsewhere. Assuming that the Security Council is either 
unwilling or unable to act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the 
combination of these equitable general principles of law may serve as a 
legal basis to permit a State or group of States to intervene to enforce the 
injunction by whatever means are required, which may include the use of 
force. 
The equitable general principles discussed above would seem to 
suggest the possibility of the beginnings of a legal framework upon 
which to build a new model for humanitarian intervention within the law. 
Such a model also contains a code of conduct for would-be interveners. 
In this respect, it is germane to recall the pronouncements of Judge 
Hudson in the Meuse case. The ideas of ‘he who seeks equity must do 
equity’, and clean hands doctrine entail that any intervening powers, in 
order to maintain the equitable right to intervene, must themselves be 
free of iniquity. Clean hands doctrine precludes the involvement of 
States in operations to end gross human rights abuses which themselves 
engage in similar practices. This principle creates an incentive for states 
to keep their hands clean, thereby permitting them a greater degree of 
free choice in their foreign policy. ‘He who seeks equity must do equity’ 
represents the prospective corollary of clean hands doctrine. Ergo, if one 
resorts to equity, one must be prepared to act equitably, and not derive 
undue profit from equity’s operation. This may potentially have immense 
importance in the conduct of humanitarian intervention, requiring that 
intervening powers, in undertaking an intervention to protect human 
rights, respect human rights norms (including international humanitarian 
law) in their conduct of such an intervention. Failure to do so may rob 
the operation of its legality under general principles of law. 
On the basis of the principles discussed above, a framework for 
humanitarian intervention within the law begins to emerge, including a 
code of conduct for would-be interveners, restraining and prescribing the 
conditions under which such activities may be carried out. It presupposes 
the commission of a series of gross and systematic human rights abuses 
by a State against its own citizens; the unavailability of a peaceable 
means of halting these abuses; the improcurability of a UN Security 
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Council Resolution in favor of enforcement action; and the reasonable 
determination that armed intervention will represent the only remedy that 
is likely to be effective in halting the abuses. Further, no State which 
itself engages in similar violations may dispose of a right to intervene, 
and States must intervene for the purpose of ending such violations, and 
must not act unscrupulously or cause unnecessary loss of life or human 
suffering in executing the operation.  
F. Whither the R2P? 
The description above is admittedly rather brief. Elsewhere, I have 
elaborated upon this framework in considerably greater detail.91 
However, for the present purposes, the sketch provided herein ought to 
be broadly sufficient. It serves to illustrate that the third principal source 
of international law – namely general principles – may conceivably be 
employed to soften the rigor of the UN Charter regime on the use of 
force by States and render it more flexible in the name of equity. This is 
an important point. Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties – also reflecting customary law – prescribes that 
extraneous norms of international law must be taken into account in the 
interpretation of international conventions. This provision makes it clear 
that general principles are not merely a discretionary consideration, but 
rather a prescriptive component of any interpretation of the Charter’s 
norms, including those that pertain to the use of force. The fact that this 
is the case, and that the R2P was explicitly crafted with the aim of 
presenting a framework for humanitarian intervention that would solve 
the impasse that had previously been seen to exist in international law, 
renders the decision not to minutely examine all the component elements 
of the law itself rather baffling. It is true that, as already noted, the study 
of general principles had long ceased to be en vogue. However, any 
international lawyer with a modicum of education should have been 
aware of their existence. The R2P presented a framework replete with 
many faults, which have been discussed in some detail above. Over and 
above the other problems with the Responsibility to Protect initiative, 
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however, was the fact that it was rooted in legal nothingness. It thus 
implied either the outright rejection of current international law – 
unlikely for a model that endeavored to engage with legal concepts such 
as State sovereignty and institutions such as the Security Council – or a 
wholesale reform thereof, something that was never likely, and 
ultimately proved beyond its powers. Worse still, R2P, or a rather 
deformed version thereof, became a starting point for the crafting of an 
analogous ‘duty to prevent’ acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
providing a casus belli in circumstances far removed from those for 
which the framework was originally conceived. 
Critiques of the R2P now have a rather superfluous ring, and may be 
compared to beating a dead man.92 The initiative’s supporters, in their 
belief that some progress was better than none, watered down the 
concept to near-meaninglessness, with the principal tenet of the 2005 
World Summit Outcome Document’s formulation of the R2P merely 
serving to reconfirm the role of the Security Council as the ultimate 
arbiter of when force might be used within the law, and restating that 
Permanent Members should be unfettered in their discretion, thus 
entirely defeating the purpose of the original concept. However, with any 
model that was so detached from the normative corpus of international 
law, the assent of States to changes in positive law was always likely to 
be a sine qua non of its success. The regrettable truth, however, is that it 
did not have to be this way. As illustrated in this essay, the means of 
softening the rigors of the regime on the use of force – or elements 
thereof – lay within the law itself. Taking account of the general 
principles of law discussed above, along with placing emphasis on the 
ius cogens and erga omnes nature of certain human rights obligations 
would have added considerable weight to the conclusions of the R2P 
Report. It would have been difficult for any State to argue that such 
principles did not form part of international law, since they underpin 
many of the essential legal and contractual relationships between States. 
Rejecting principles such as estoppel – effectively emanations of good 
faith – would have been complicated and impracticable. The debate 
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would have been one of interpretation, rather than implementation. A de 
minimis interpretation of the impact of general principles – flexible as 
they are – would certainly have less of an impact upon the regime on the 
use of force. However, in such circumstances, the power would already 
have been taken away from the Security Council, as it would be for the 
international community of States to determine how such principles 
ought to be applied in concrete terms. An Advisory Opinion of the ICJ 
could potentially have been sought as part of the R2P initiative if a 
conclusive legal determination were needed. Things could have been 
considerably different. However, the Report’s drafters ignored general 
principles, and thus denied themselves the usage of an important – 
though oft-overlooked – component of the international lawyer’s toolkit. 
In essence, they were fighting with one hand tied behind their back, 
though they were seemingly oblivious to this fact. 
CONCLUSION 
A reformed conception of the Responsibility to Protect may, in time, 
be possible. Alternatively, a new initiative may supersede it. However, in 
truth, the R2P is merely one of a great number of utopian frameworks 
proposed to solve the humanitarian intervention conundrum. The 
Canadian report appeared contemporaneously to reports sponsored by the 
Dutch and Danish governments. At the same time, the leading lights of 
international law were queuing up to cast their respective two cents into 
the debate. Generally, each proposal contained a framework based upon 
some sort of standard of quasi-legality or legitimacy, and a series of 
threshold conditions. The model proposed in this essay, based upon 
general principles, appears superficially rather similar, and the thresholds 
would be at home in many of the tests proposed over the past fifteen 
years or so. There is, however, a crucial difference. While the R2P and 
its contemporaries were legally rootless, the roots of the framework 
sketched above run deep into some of the most rudimentary principles of 
public international law. The framework  based on general principles 
permits resort to humanitarian intervention without straying outside the 
law. In return for being granted this right, however, States must present 
clean hands, and comport themselves equitably in the execution of the 
intervention. This goes some way towards guarding against abuse. 
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The model presented is rudimentary. It leaves a number of important 
questions open – not least regarding enforceability, the reaction of States 
to such a proposal, and its implications for international stability. 
However, its superiority to the R2P as a doctrine grounded in the lex lata 
rather than the lex utopia must surely be obvious. Based upon pre-
existing and pre-defined norms that have been subject to the 
interpretation of the PCIJ and ICJ, its terminology is not entirely 
indeterminate as was the case with the R2P, and therefore cannot be 
twisted every which way but loose by unscrupulous State actors to suit 
their individual agendas. It offers hope that answers lie within the law, 
rather than beyond it. While resurrecting the dead man R2P would seem 
beyond the power of general principles, however, the latter may offer an 
alternative to the former if the possibilities offered by their normative 
power are properly explored. The next blue riband commission 
established to chart a solution to the humanitarian intervention problem 
must not ignore the full array of sources of international law. One is 
much more likely to win a fight if one has both fists at one’s disposal. 
 
